The egyptian upheaval is far from over. It continues to set in motion reactions inside and events all over the Arab world.
The media continue speak too often about the Arab world as if it were a coherent, organized “ensemble” of nations. Identical causes are also supposed to lead to identical effects. This superficial overview does not take into account the many structural differences which exist in the Arab world. Suffice to scrutinize the workings of the Arab League which is a lame duck since the day of its creation. The almost identical mantle of authoritarian regimes does not cover the same reality. Likewise the hidden antagonisms between Arab states surface as soon as the binding element of religion disappears. The Mecca link or the anti-Israel paranoia cannot compensate for the tensions which prevail between Sunni and Shia power or between Wahhabism and Jihadism. It is hard to find an Egyptian who likes Morocco, or to perceive a common denominator between the necrophiliac leader in Libya and the, for the time being, rather enlightened system in Turkey. The fight over water will even further oppose brother against brother. The Gulf States prefer the allure of Canary Wharf to the voice of the messenger of Jihad.
The Egyptian outcome is the result of a combination of multiple factors that are for their major part indigenous. We have only seen Act 1 by the way and the social, political, econnomic aftershocks remain unpredictable. The possible trouble in Yemen, Jordan, Libya etc. might have related causes but they might activate different effects. In Egypt, the absence of a succession or identification with an agreed alternative leadership, made room for the professionalism of the armed forces. The vacuum could be avoided. For how long ? In the short term the power elites remain the same. So are the problems.
This does in no way diminish the importance of what happened , but the outcome remains ideologically more hybrid than coherent. The wave which sent Mubarak packing has no defined agenda. There is no personality like Nelson Mandela or Lech Walesa to galvanize the Egyptians inside and the Arabs outside. The strength of the change in Cairo is also its weakness. The street believes it got the upper hand but the Establishment remains, for now at least, at the helm. It is too early to predict the outcome of what might be a radical change for the better or an amended continuation of the same. The military are a state within the state . The recent cautious American embrace for democracy in Egypt could very well lead the military to take measures which look ”all right” on the surface but which might be just “placebos”, set in motion to avoid the repeat of scenarios like the ones we have seen in Gaza or Lebanon. Free elections gave – for the West and Arab leaders- undesirable results. It is true that in Egypt a memory still survives of a pluralistic, multi-party society. The Muslim Brothers might not be as formidable as some predict. Still they constitute an organized force, rooted in history which could take advantage of opportunities that might appear once the euphoria recedes.
Nevertheless the contagion in Arab states is unlikely. The Iranian joker will certainly attempt to take advantage of the situation, twisting events, attempting to give the Egyptian change an Islamic content, which it did not have. Until the elections the interim in Egypt might also set in motion uncertainties which could allow a spontaneous movement to be hijacked for a more perverse cause. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will apply any pressure so that the Egyptian army (too close to the USA) or some Egyptian Kerensky might not get the opportunity to attempt to play the role of peacemaker with the civil society .On the other hand, the Egyptian Military might also change course and cling on to power. Other Arab states meanwhile will certainly initiate real or half-baked reforms to avoid at any cost a copycat scenario.
It is clear that the West has largely misinterpreted the signals and lost consensual oversight of the events. The “intelligence” which still plays old cold war games was yet again faulty. The successive policy adjustments might come home to roost . They were as totally unconvincing in Egypt as they were in Tunisia. The Americans and the French were equally taken by surprise and were obliged to continuously calibrate their position, post facto. It is to be expected that the west might have to make some difficult choices. Incidents and turmoil will erupt elsewhere and it would be ironic that the USA for example would back freedom “a la carte” and not as a moral obligation. It is wiser to stay abreast of an evolution rather than to be a reluctant follower. One has to follow a double track : dialogue with traditional US allies-preventive, discreet diplomacy- and encouragement of democratic evolution -creative policy-.All this will require tact and modulation. Iran is not the United Arab Republics, Morocco is not Algeria. All those countries are not equal , indifferent pieces of a larger puzzle. They present us with specific challenges which in turn require tailor-made interaction both with the (friendly) power structure and with the legitimate demands of the people. Iran is a case sui generis because it doesn’t confront the West with a choice. The Ayatollahs must go. The nuclear doomsday ambition has to be stopped.
In the future, on condition that the level of overall security might have risen, a day might come when Israel might consequently be asked to lay its cards on the table.
Only the resolution of the Palestinian question is the “ way out” if the West wants to avoid undesirable results becoming the offspring of desirable events. A Palestinian state will deprive the extremists of the flame to ignite or of the message to enflame. The democracy in the present Arab confusion can only become reality if it is also experienced as a simultaneous equation for the making of a Palestinian state. This will in turn allow Arab states to live in the realm of diversity and not in the fantasy of some Caliphat which would turn the clock backwards again.
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